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I. INTRODUCTION
HERE were some significant changes to confession, search, and
seizure jurisprudence during the 2011 Survey period. As usual,
the Supreme Court of the United States delivered opinions that
will undoubtedly affect Texas law. This impact will be mainly felt in the
area of confessions-especially confessions stemming from custodial in-
terrogation. The Court did, however, touch on one major issue surround-
ing searches and seizures: whether employees have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in using electronic communication devices issued
by their employers. With one major exception, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and Texas state courts focused on following Supreme Court pre-
cedent and clarified established law. This exception comes from the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's opinion modifying Texas's version of
the Plain View Doctrine.
*James Taylor Wells is the law clerk to Judge Michael E. Keasler.
** Michael E. Keasler is a judge on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
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II. CONFESSIONS
That "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself" is one of many individual rights bestowed upon
all citizens by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.1 To protect
this right, in Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a
set of warnings that are an "absolute prerequisite" to interrogation of a
suspect in police custody.2 The reason for Miranda's strong language dic-
tating these warnings as mandatory is that custodial interrogation easily
creates an environment so inherently coercive that it violates the Fifth
Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination. 3 Now, over
forty years later, police officers must still give all suspects in custody the
Miranda warnings before interrogation begins, but there is no question
the landscape has changed.
Over the years, certain Miranda-related issues were repeatedly raised
and the Court consistently denied certiorari. 4 Justice Breyer foreshad-
owed the present, however, in his statement regarding the Court's denial
of certiorari in Bridgers v. Texas. He predicted that, because police of-
ficers frequently read Miranda warnings from varying standard forms, the
Court might face endless petitions for certiorari concerning effectiveness
of Miranda warnings. 5 And during the last term the accuracy of his ex-
pectation was confirmed-the Court decided to hear Maryland v.
Shatzer,6 Florida v. Powell,7 and Berghuis v. Thompkins.8 Exactly how
these cases have changed Miranda's landscape is yet to be fully under-
stood, but one thing is certain-all three holdings are sympathetic to law
enforcement, which will make it more difficult for defendants to prevail
during suppression proceedings.
A. BREAKS IN CUSTODY: THE FOURTEEN-DAY RULE
A detective went to a Maryland prison to interrogate inmate Michael
Shatzer about a sexual-abuse allegation. 9 Because Shatzer insisted on
having an attorney present during the interrogation, the detective termi-
nated the questioning and closed the case. Two-and-a-half years later-
long after Shatzer had been released into the general prison population-
another detective attempted to interrogate Shatzer regarding the same
allegation. This time Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made incrim-
inating statements. Pursuant to Edwards v. Arizona (discussed in detail
below) Shatzer moved to suppress these statements. A Maryland trial
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-72 (1966).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Bridgers v. Quarterman, 548 U.S. 909 (2006); Bridgers v. Texas, 532 U.S.
1034 (2001); Anthon v. United States, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
5. See Bridgers, 532 U.S. at 1034.
6. 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
7. 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
8. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
9. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217.
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judge denied Shatzer's request, reasoning that the Edwards protections
did not apply because of the break in custody between the first and sec-
ond interrogations. 10 Then, based partly on Shatzer's statements made
during the second interrogation, the trial judge found him guilty of sexual
abuse.'1 Holding that "the passage of time alone is insufficient to end the
protections afforded by Edwards," the Maryland Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded. 12
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia expounded upon the rules an-
nounced in Miranda v. Arizona and Edwards v. Arizona.13 In Miranda
the Court held that, before the start of a custodial interrogation, a suspect
must be informed: (1) of the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement
made by the suspect can and will be used against the suspect in court; (3)
that the suspect has the right to consult with an attorney and to have an
attorney present throughout interrogation; and (4) the right to have an
attorney appointed in the case of an indigent suspect. 14 These Miranda
rights serve to "protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incrimi-
nate themselves. 15 But the Court determined that "additional safe-
guards" were needed to protect a suspect's right to counsel at a
subsequent interrogation when the suspect had made a request for coun-
sel at a previous interrogation. 16 These safeguards come from Edwards,
where the Court held that when a suspect demands an attorney during
custodial interrogation, an officer may not further interrogate the suspect
until an attorney is made available or the suspect independently initiates
communication with the officer.17
In Shatzer, the Court addressed whether an officer may, after a break
in custody, reinitiate custodial interrogation of a prisoner who previously
asserted his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.1 8 The "inherently com-
pelling pressures" of custodial interrogation led the Court to conclude
that Shatzer was in custody for purposes of Miranda. And police officers
read the Miranda warnings to Shatzer before his initial and subsequent
interrogations. In its holding, the majority explained a prisoner's waiver
of Miranda rights at a subsequent interrogation, coupled with a break in
custody of at least fourteen days, adequately protects against the coercive
affects of custodial interrogation.19 The Court also held that the release
of a prisoner into the general prison population is a break in custody for
the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 20 "[L]awful imprisonment im-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1218.
13. Id. at 1219-24.
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
15. Id. at 467.
16. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
17. Id. at 484-85.
18. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218.
19. Id. at 1223.
20. Id. at 1224-25.
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posed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures
identified in Miranda." Therefore, release back into the general prison
population after interrogation is a break in Miranda custody.
If the Court decided Edwards never lets police reinitiate interrogation
after a break in custody, too many suspects would never be questioned.
A suspect would only have to ask for a lawyer and the suspect would
always be shielded from questioning-even if decades go by and the po-
lice gathered mounds of new evidence. The Court even noted that with-
out a limit on Edwards, the rule would bar questioning on completely
different crimes than the crime a suspect was first questioned about.2 1
But if the Court decided that Edwards could be brushed aside by any
break in custody, law enforcement would have almost unbridled discre-
tion in questioning a suspect.22 Police could simply first release a suspect
who demanded a lawyer then immediately re-arrest the suspect, opening
the door to further questioning without a lawyer, and the Miranda right
to counsel would be rendered meaningless. 23
Thus, the Court faced a tough decision. The majority explained that
"the Edwards rule is not a constitutional mandate, but judicially pre-
scribed prophylaxis," and therefore subject to the Court's revision.24 The
majority also noted that "[llower courts have uniformly held that a break
in custody ends the Edwards presumption. '2 5 After discussing costs and
benefits of the Edwards rule, the Court decided there was no justification
to extend it.26 Therefore, after a sufficient break in custody, repeating
the Miranda warnings to a suspect is enough to ensure that reinitiating
interrogation will not infringe upon that suspect's rights. 27
But choosing how long the break in custody must be to satisfy the pur-
pose of Edwards-to protect a suspect's right to counsel at a subsequent
interrogation when the suspect had made a request for counsel at a previ-
ous interrogation-was no easy task. With no guideposts to follow, the
Court came up with fourteen days.28 While appearing to be an arbitrary
number, as the Court points out it is a number police need to know; they
cannot be left to guess whether a break in custody lasted long enough to
re-question a suspect, especially when time is of the essence.
The Court stated fourteen days "provides plenty of time for the suspect
to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel,
and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody. '2 9 But
why is a fourteen-day break in custody long enough for a suspect to get
back into the ordinary rhythm of life? Why not five days? Why not thirty
21. Id. at 1222.
22. See id. at 1223.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 1220.
25. Id. (citing People v. Storm, 52 P.3d 52, 61-62 (Cal. 2002) (internal citations omit-
ted) (collecting state and federal cases)).
26. Id. at 1222.
27. Id.




days? These questions have yet to be answered. Thus, the Court's new
fourteen-day rule regarding the invocation of the right to counsel is open
to attack-something prosecutors and defense attorneys should keep in
mind.
In Herrera v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals "refuse[d] to equate
incarceration with 'custody' for purposes of Miranda when an inmate is
questioned by a state agent about an offense unrelated to the inmate's
incarceration. ' 30 The court explained that to determine whether the in-
terrogation of an inmate constitutes Miranda custody, certain factors
should be evaluated:
(1) the language used to summon the inmate;
(2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation;
(3) the extent to which the inmate is confronted with evidence of his
or her guilt;
(4) the additional pressure exerted to detain the inmate or the
change in the surroundings of the inmate which results in an added
imposition on the inmate's freedom of movement; and
(5) the inmate's freedom to leave the scene and the purpose, place,
and length of the questioning. 31
The Supreme Court in Shatzer, however, opined that there is no ques-
tion that Shatzer was in custody during both of his interrogations.32 Dur-
ing Shatzer's first interrogation, the officer told Shatzer that the
interrogation was unrelated to his incarceration. And Shatzer's second
interrogation took place away from the general prison population in a
maintenance room equipped with a desk and chairs. Some Herrera fac-
tors were present in Shatzer and some were not. Thus, it is unclear
whether Shatzer undermines or is consistent with Herrera. For the time
being, Texas attorneys should continue to use the Herrera factors to de-
termine custody in the prison context-it should not be assumed that
Shatzer means incarceration is per se Miranda custody.
As of the writing of this article, Shatzer has had some, albeit little, im-
pact in Texas federal courts-"it has been" cited in only three cases, two
which do not involve the fourteen-day rule. In Cooper v. Thaler, the
Southern District of Texas used Shatzer as authority in holding a suspect
can waive Miranda rights.33 While not a novel concept, the facts in
Cooper did not involve a break in custody plus a subsequent interroga-
tion. Similarly, in United States v. Velasco-Garcia, the Southern District
of Texas used Shatzer in determining a traffic stop did not constitute Mi-
randa custody. 34 The facts in Velasco-Garcia, however, did not involve
interrogating someone in custody, a break in custody, then reinterrogat-
ing the same person. Thus, Cooper and Velasco-Garcia do not give any
guidance as to how Shatzer will ultimately change jurisprudence in
30. 241 S.W.3d 520, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
31. Id.
32. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
33. No. H-09-2261, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35466, at *25 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010).
34. No. C-10-910, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124043, at *19 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2010).
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Texas's federal courts. In United States v. Mendez-Arredondo, the South-
ern District of Texas did, however, use Shatzer's fourteen-day rule.35 In
that case, the defendant was detained after crossing a bridge between the
United States and Mexico. He requested an attorney during his initial
interrogation, thus the officer terminated the questioning. Later the
same day, a different officer read the defendant his Miranda rights and
obtained a confession. The court held that, because the defendant was
subjected to reinterrogation before "an attorney was made available, the
Defendant himself reinitiated communication, or there was a fourteen
day break in Defendant's custody," his Fifth Amendment rights were vio-
lated.36 Thus, the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress. 37
Mendez-Arredondo indicates that federal courts in Texas will abide by
Shatzer's fourteen-day rule under the right facts.
Shatzer has been discussed twice in Texas state cases. In Pecina v.
State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals cited to Shatzer but only during
an explanation of Edwards v. Arizona.38 The court of appeals noted
Shatzer added the fourteen-day rule to the Edwards rule.39 Because
there was no break in custody, however, the court of appeals did not ap-
ply Shatzer to Pecina.40 The Beaumont Court of Appeals also cited
Shatzer when explaining Edwards.41 But, like the Pecina court, because
there was no break in custody, that court did not apply Shatzer. The
Beaumont Court of Appeals made no mention of the fourteen-day rule. 42
B. MIRANDA'S RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL WARNING
In Florida v. Powell, the Supreme Court considered whether warnings
that "a suspect has 'the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of
the law enforcement officers' questions,' and that he can invoke this right
'at any time.., during the interview,"' satisfy Miranda.43 The Court held
the warnings sufficient.44
Tampa police officers found Powell, who was under investigation for
robbery, at his girlfriend's apartment as he was leaving the bedroom. A
search of the bedroom produced a loaded handgun. As a convicted felon,
Powell was placed under arrest and taken to police headquarters. Before
interrogation, he was read the Tampa Police Department Consent and
Release Form. Powell acknowledged that he understood his rights. He
also said he was willing to speak to the officers. Then, after signing the
Consent and Release Form, Powell admitted to owning the handgun.
35. No. L-10-902, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99463, at *12-13 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2010).
36. Id.
37. Id. at *13.
38. 226 S.W.3d 249, 260 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth July 15, 2010, pet. granted).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 253-55.
41. Spence v. State, No. 09-08-00369-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 4725, at *10 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont June 23, 2010, pet. denied).
42. Id.
43. 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1199-1200 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471).
44. Id. at 1200.
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In support of his motion to suppress the statement admitting handgun
ownership, Powell argued in trial court that the Miranda rights read to
him were insufficient because they did not apprise him of the right to
have an attorney present during interrogation. Opining that the officers
properly put Powell on notice of his right to an attorney, the trial judge
denied Powell's motion to suppress and convicted him of unlawful gun
possession.45 But because the Florida appellate court believed the Mi-
randa warnings did not adequately inform Powell of his right to have an
attorney present during questioning, the court held Powell's incriminating
statements should have been suppressed.46 Determining that "the advice
Powell received was misleading because it suggested that Powell could
'only consult with an attorney before questioning,"' the Florida Supreme
Court agreed with the lower court.47
After highlighting why the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear
Powell, it undertook a discussion of Miranda. The Court found the warn-
ings given to Powell-that "a suspect has 'the right to talk to a lawyer
before answering any of the law enforcement officers' questions,' and
that he can invoke this right 'at any time during the interview' "-satisfied
Miranda.48
Because "the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can
operate very quickly to overbear the will of [an individual] merely made
aware of" the right to remain silent, the Miranda rule that a suspect being
questioned "must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with
a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation" is an "ab-
solute prerequisite to interrogation. '49 But, according to the Court, there
are no exact words necessary to adequately convey this right.50 In fact, in
the past, the Court stated that when determining the adequacy of Mi-
randa warnings, there is no requirement that lower courts review the
words used "as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement.
The inquiry is simply whether the warnings 'reasonably convey to a sus-
pect his rights as required by Miranda."'51
The Court held the warning given to Powell satisfied this standard of
reasonableness. 52 The first portion of the warning, that Powell had the
right to consult with an attorney before answering any questions, con-
veyed to Powell exactly what it stated-that he could speak to an attor-
ney before the interrogation began.53 And the second portion of the
warning, that Powell can invoke this right at any time during the inter-
view, conveyed to Powell "that he could exercise [his] right while the in-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1201 (quoting State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 541 (Fla. 2008)).
48. Id. at 1199-1200.
49. Id. at 1203 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 469-71).
50. Id. at 1204 (citing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981)).
51. Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989)).
52. Id. at 1205-06.
53. Id. at 1204-05.
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terrogation was underway. ' 54  The Court concluded that "[i]n
combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell's right to
have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interrogation, but at all
times."'55 In the Court's opinion, it would have been unreasonable for
Powell to interpret the warning in any other way.56
Does the decision in Powell expand the language that may be used to
convey Miranda warnings? Or does it approve using more limited warn-
ings? Either way, it is now clear that police officers do not have to explic-
itly inform a suspect of his or her right to have an attorney present during
interrogation. The Court wrote that the right-to-counsel warning used by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is "exemplary" because it
states that: "You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we
ask you any questions [and] the right to have a lawyer with you during
questioning," but "its precise formulation [is not] necessary to meet Mi-
randa's requirements. '57 Because the FBI warnings and the warnings
given to Powell both satisfy Miranda, and one explicitly states an accused
has the right to an attorney during questioning while the other does not,
it is clear that police officers have considerable leeway in administering
the right-to-counsel warning. 58 Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure provides a list of admonishments that a trial judge must
give to a defendant before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.5 9
But the court only has to substantially comply with these admonish-
ments.60 Now, based on Powell, it appears substantial compliance is also
part of the Miranda rule.
The warning, however, must still reasonably convey to a suspect that he
or she has the right to counsel before and throughout the entire interro-
gation.61 Thus, a defendant can still prevail in a motion to suppress state-
ments made after an unreasonable or non-existent right-to-counsel
Miranda warning.62 Therefore, defense attorneys must investigate the ex-
act language used by law enforcement. If the right to counsel warning
was unreasonably conveyed, unclear, or non-existent, Powell might bene-
fit the defendant in a motion to suppress.
Powell had even less of an impact than Shatzer in Texas courts. Powell
has not been used in any Texas state cases and has come up sparingly in
Texas federal cases. In United States v. Strother, the district court found
that the arresting officer read the complete set of Miranda warnings to
the defendant. 63 The Fifth Circuit used Powell as authority in holding the
54. Id. at 1205.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1206.
58. See id.
59. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (West 2010).
60. Id. § (c).
61. See Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205.
62. See id. at 1205-06.
63. No. 09-40169, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17765, at *3-4 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2010).
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district court's finding was not clearly erroneous.64 The Fifth Circuit,
however, did not discuss the right-to-counsel warning. Thus, Strother
gives no guidance as to how the Fifth Circuit will interpret Powell.
C. IMPLIED WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
In Berghuis v. Thompkins,65 a shooting in Michigan left one victim
dead while another survived. Thompkins, a suspect in the shooting, suc-
cessfully evaded police for close to a year, but was later found and ar-
rested in Ohio. Two Michigan police officers traveled to Ohio to
interrogate Thompkins.
The interrogation took place in an eight foot by ten foot room and
lasted nearly three hours. Similar to the events in Powell, the interroga-
tion of Thompkins began with the reading of a standard Miranda form.
There was no conflict as to whether the form complied with Miranda; it
included all the necessary warnings. But there was a conflict as to
whether Thompkins verbally acknowledged understanding the rights con-
tained in the form. An officer asked Thompkins to read the fifth warning
aloud, which Thompkins did, but he refused to sign the form.
Other than an occasional "yeah, no, or I don't know," Thompkins re-
mained virtually silent for the first two hours and forty-five minutes of
the interrogation.66 Telling the officers that his chair was hard and that
he did not want a peppermint were the only other things Thompkins said
during this time; he never requested an attorney, stated he wished to re-
main silent, or stated he did not want to speak to the officers. Officer
Helgert then asked Thompkins, "Do you believe in God? '67 Thompkins
responded that he did.68 Officer Helgert then asked, "Do you pray to
God?"'69 Thompkins again answered in the affirmative.70 Finally, Officer
Helgert asked, "Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy
down?" 71 Thompkins again said "[y]es. ' '72 Thompkins argued in a mo-
tion to suppress that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent, thus requiring the officers to end the interrogation immediately.
He also argued that he at no time waived this right, and therefore his
statements were involuntary. The trial judge denied Thompkins's motion
to suppress, and a jury found him guilty of murder.73 He was later sen-
tenced to life without parole. 74 The trial judge denied his motion for new
trial.75 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Thompkins had not in-
64. Id.
65. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
66. Id. at 2256-57.






73. Id. at 2257-58.




voked his right to remain silent but had waived it.76 He requested habeas
relief from the federal district court but was unsuccessful. 77 Moving up
the appellate chain, the Sixth Circuit granted Thompkins relief, reasoning
he had not impliedly waived his right to remain silent.78
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Thompkins's argument that he in-
voked his right to remain silent.79 The Court held that when determining
whether an accused has invoked the right to remain silent, courts must
use the standard for determining whether the right to counsel was in-
voked.80 This standard requires the accused to "unambiguously" invoke
the right to counsel. 81 If an accused makes no statement regarding coun-
sel or makes a statement that is "ambiguous or equivocal," then the right
to counsel was not invoked.82 The same now holds true when invoking
the right to remain silent.8 3 Because efficient law enforcement is a must,
when faced with ambiguity "police are not required to end the interroga-
tion or ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his or
her Miranda rights. '8 4 Here, Thompkins did not unambiguously invoke
his right to remain silent.85 If he said "that he wanted to remain silent or
that he did not want to talk with the police," he would have invoked his
right, but he made neither statement. 86
The Court then addressed whether Thompkins waived his right to re-
main silent. The Court stated that, when an accused fails to invoke the
right to remain silent, any statement made during an interrogation is
inadmissible according to Miranda "unless the prosecution can establish
that the accused 'in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda
rights' when making the statement. '87 The Court also noted that Mi-
randa seems to suggest that without "an explicit written waiver or a for-
mal, express oral statement," the prosecution will have a hard time
establishing a waiver by the accused.88 But, according to the Court, some
of its decisions since Miranda ease the prosecution's burden.89 Through
Thompkins, the Court reiterated Miranda rights can be "impliedly
waived 'through the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding
of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.'"90 It seems
Thompkins invalidates Miranda's suggestion that "an explicit written




79. Id. at 2259.
80. Id. at 2260.
81. Id. at 2259.
82. Id. at 2259-60 (internal citations omitted).
83. Id. at 2260.
84. Id. at 2259-60.
85. Id. at 2260.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
88. Id. at 2261.
89. Id. (citing Butler, 441 U.S. at 370-72, 376.
90. Id. (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373).
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rights.91 The practical effect of Thompkins: (1) allows an implied waiver
of Miranda rights if the prosecution establishes the accused was given
Miranda warnings, understood them, and made uncoerced statements;
and (2) statements of an accused will be admissible in court, even when
an explicit waiver did not precede interrogation. 92
The Court held that Thompkins waived the right to remain silent.93
"There is no basis in this case to conclude that he did not understand his
rights; and on these facts it follows that he chose not to invoke or rely on
those rights when he did speak."'94 The fact that Thompkins was given a
copy of the Miranda form, that he understood English, and that he read
the fifth warning aloud shows he understood his rights.95 Thompkins's
responses to Officer Helgert's questions about praying to God further
constituted "a course of conduct indicating waiver" of the right to remain
silent.96 Last, the Court concluded that Thompkins's statements were not
coerced. 97
From Powell, we learn police officers do not have to explicitly inform a
suspect of his or her right to have an attorney present during interroga-
tion to comply with Miranda.98 Similarly, Thompkins teaches us that Mi-
randa rights can be waived by an accused even when the interrogating
officer does not explicitly discuss the waiver with the accused.99 Miranda
warnings must still be given, the accused must still understand them,
there must be conduct constituting waiver, and statements made cannot
be coerced, but it appears the Court opened the door to implied waivers
becoming commonplace. 100 And the Court's holding in Thompkins
should not be read too narrowly. Because the Court analyzed invoking
the right to remain silent in the same analysis used to determine whether
the right to counsel has been invoked, there is no reason to believe the
Court's implied-waiver discussion will apply only to the right to remain
silent; it will likely apply to all Miranda rights.10 1
As evidenced by Justice Sotomayor's blistering dissent in Thompkins,
there will undoubtedly be some question as to the strength of implied
waivers.102 Although absence of an explicit waiver of Miranda rights no
longer forecloses the possibility of custodial interrogation, police officers
wanting to avoid suppression should obtain explicit waivers. This is likely
the most effective way to ensure the admissibility of any statements elic-
91. Id. at 2260-61.
92. See id. at 2261-62.
93. Id. at 2262.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2263.
97. Id.
98. See generally Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
99. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 2260.
102. See generally id. at 2266-78 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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ited from an accused. But, should an explicit waiver fail, a court might
find an implied waiver to be valid.
Thompkins has not been a major player in Texas law during this Survey
period. In United States v. Whitmore, the Fifth Circuit used Thompkins as
authority to reiterate the proposition that, "[u]nder Miranda, a 'suspect
must unambiguously request counsel."' 10 3 The court explained that
Thompkins extended this principle to the right to remain silent.10 4 And,
based on Thompkins, the court held one of the defendants did not un-
equivocally invoke his right to counsel when he asked "how he could go
about getting a court appointed attorney. ' 10 5 The court's application of
Thompkins did not center on the principles discussed above-that (1) im-
plied waivers of Miranda rights are permissible if the prosecution estab-
lishes that the accused was given Miranda warnings, understood them,
and voluntarily made statements; and (2) to be admissible in court, an
accused need not make an explicit waiver before interrogation begins.
Thus, Whitmore, one of the few cases in which the Fifth Circuit men-
tioned Thompkins, offers little (if any) insight into how Thompkins will
affect Texas law. Thompkins appears in one other Fifth Circuit case, but
the court only mentioned it in a discussion of what standard federal
courts must apply when petitioners seek habeas relief from state-court
decisions.10 6
Texas state courts discussed Thompkins even less than the Fifth Circuit.
In Estrada v. State, the appellant was not in custody while questioned by
the police; thus, he was not entitled to be informed of his Miranda
rights.10 7 An officer did, however, inform the appellant of his Miranda
rights and that he was allowed to leave. But the appellant made it clear
that he was there on his own volition. Without expressly waiving any
rights, the appellant confessed to the crime while giving a voluntary state-
ment to the police. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained,
based on Thompkins, that "the totality of the circumstances indicate that
appellant knowingly waived [his Miranda rights]."' 10 8 The court opined
that Thompkins made it clear that the "prosecution does not need to
show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express."'1 9 It is now entirely
possible that many suspects in Texas will inadvertently waive their rights
during interrogation, something both prudent prosecutors and defense
attorneys must pay close attention to.




106. Paredes v. Thaler, 617 F.3d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2010).
107. 313 S.W.3d 274, 289-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
108. Id. at 300.
109. Id. (citing Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261-62).
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III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
A. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY IN THE WORKPLACE
During this Survey period, the Supreme Court only granted certiorari
in two cases involving Fourth Amendment issues. One case is City of
Ontario v. Quon.110 In 2001, the City of Ontario, California purchased
alphanumeric pagers with text-messaging capabilities and distributed
them to certain officers in the Ontario Police Department (OPD), includ-
ing Officer Jeff Quon. The City issued a "Computer Usage, Internet and
E-Mail Policy" to each officer that received a pager.111 The policy stated
"the City reserve[d] the right to monitor and log all network activity...
[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when us-
ing [the pagers]." 112 Arch Wireless (Arch) established a plan with the
City giving each pager a certain number of characters that could be sent
and received each month. The City incurred additional fees for usage
exceeding the allotted amount. When Quon and others exceeded their
monthly limits multiple times, the OPD chief obtained transcripts of text
messages from Quon and another employee. The OPD audited the tran-
scripts to determine if the overages were due to work or personal
messages. Upon examining the transcripts, the OPD learned that many
of Quon's messages were personal in nature and some contained sexually
explicit material. OPD's internal affairs division handled the situation
and Quon was reprimanded.
Quon and others filed suit against the City and several OPD officers.
They alleged that the City and its officers violated the Fourth Amend-
ment and the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) when they ac-
quired and read the text-message transcripts. They also alleged that Arch
violated the SCA by providing the text-message transcripts to the OPD.
A California federal district judge determined that Quon had a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in his text messages, but the judge held a jury
trial to determine whether the audit of the messages was reasonable.1 13
The court opined that "if the audit's purpose 'was to determine the effi-
cacy of the existing character limits to ensure that officers were not pay-
ing hidden work-related costs, no constitutional violation occurred."' 114
Because the audit was to "determine the efficacy of the character limits,"
the jury concluded that it was a reasonable search and therefore not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 115 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the district court that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy con-
cerning the text messages.1 16 But the circuit court held that, although the
audit was "for 'a legitimate work-related rationale,' . . . it 'was not reason-
110. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2625.
113. Id. at 2626-27.
114. Id. at 2627 quoting Guon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Sup. 2d 1116,





able in scope."' 1 7 The court provided a list of less intrusive measures
that the OPD could have used in place of the audit.118 The court also
held that Arch violated the SCA by providing the transcripts to the
OPD. 119 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding
that the search of the transcripts was reasonable.' 20
Many people think the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures by the police. While true, as the Court stated in
Quon, the Amendment also applies to the government when it "acts in its
capacity as an employer.' 2 ' The Court went on to decide Quon on nar-
row grounds; it assumed, without explicitly deciding, that (1) Quon had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages sent from his city-pro-
vided pager; (2) the audit of the transcripts was a Fourth Amendment
search; and (3) when the government "intrudes on [an] employee's pri-
vacy in the electronic sphere," it must abide by the same rules that govern
a physical search of an employee's office.122 The Court held the search
was reasonable, and thus viewed in light of either the plurality or concur-
ring opinion in O'Connor v. Ortega,l2 3 it did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 124
E-mail and text messaging are now almost universal. But should those
who use these means of communication expect electronic privacy under
the Fourth Amendment? The Court stated: "[We] must proceed with
care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in com-
munications made on electronic equipment owned by a government em-
ployer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in soci-
ety has become clear."'1 25 Thus, as a matter of practicality, one should not
decide whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists when using elec-
tronic communication devices in his or her place of employment. And
because the Court assumed, without explicitly deciding, that (1) Quon
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages sent from his
city-provided pager and (2) the audit of the transcripts was a reasonable
Fourth Amendment search, prudent attorneys should use caution when
advising clients on similar matters. 126
Last, Quon only deals with government employers. But after reading
Quon together with Mancusi v. DeForte,127 one would be ill-advised in
limiting Quon's rationale to government employers. In Mancusi, the






122. Id. at 2630.
123. See 480 U.S. 709, 718, 725-26, 731-32 (1987).
124. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633-34.
125. Id. at 2629.
126. Id. at 2630.
127. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
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has standing to object to a [physical] search of his office, as well as of his
home."'1 28 Reading this statement together with the statement from
Quon-that when the government "intrudes on [an] employee's privacy
in the electronic sphere," it must abide by the same rules that govern a
physical search of an employee's office-leads to the conclusion that
Quon could very well apply to both government and private employ-
ers. 2 9 The search must still be made by a government actor, but the
point here is that Quon can apply to both government and non-govern-
ment offices.
B. EMERGENCY AID/COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The other Fourth Amendment case decided by the Supreme Court dur-
ing this Survey period is Michigan v. Fisher.'30 In Fisher, the Court fur-
ther clarified the community caretaking/emergency aid exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 13' Officer Goolsby and his
partner responded to a disturbance call. According to a couple in the
area of the purported disturbance, a man was "going crazy" in a nearby
house. 13 2 When the officers approached the house they noticed it was in
a state of "considerable chaos."1 33 Three windows were shattered, bro-
ken glass remained on the ground, and a pickup truck with a smashed
front end was parked in the driveway. Before entering the house, the
officers noticed the smashed front end of the pickup bore stains of blood;
and not only was there blood on the truck, but also on an exterior door of
the house. A couch barricaded the front door of the house and the back
door was locked. The man "going crazy" in the house was the respon-
dent, Jeremy Fisher, and officers could see him through a window
"screaming and throwing things."'1 34 Fisher ignored the officer's knocks
on the door. When the officers noticed a laceration on Fisher's hand,
they inquired whether he needed medical care, but he responded with a
profanity-laced demand that they produce a search warrant. After ignor-
ing Fisher's demand and pushing the door partially open, Officer Goolsby
"ventured into the house" and caught a glimpse of Fisher "pointing a long
gun at him."'1 35 Officer Goolsby immediately left the house.
Fisher was charged with possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony and assault with a dangerous weapon.136 Fisher moved to
suppress Officer Goolsby's statement that "Fisher pointed a rifle at
him."1 37 A Michigan trial judge granted the motion, reasoning that Of-
128. Id. at 369.
129. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
130. 130 S. Ct. 546 (2009).
131. See id. at 548-49.





137. Id. at 547-48.
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ficer Goolsby violated Fisher's Fourth Amendment rights by entering
Fisher's house without a warrant. 138 The Michigan Court of Appeals af-
firmed the suppression order, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied
the State's request for leave to appeal.
13 9
In Brigham City v. Stuart, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "law en-
forcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emer-
gency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from
imminent injury." And in Fisher, the court held that "[a] straightforward
application of the emergency aid exception, as in Brigham City, dictates
that the officer's entry was reasonable." 140 The majority in Fisher rea-
soned that "[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-
threatening injury' to invoke the emergency aid exception."' 4' In the
Court's view, the "signs of a recent injury" together with the fact that
"Fisher [was] screaming and throwing things" were enough to deem Of-
ficer Goolsby's warrantless entry reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 142
Although the Court's holding is reasonable, the emergency aid excep-
tion is now subject to broad interpretation-possibly too broad. In
Fisher, blood on a damaged pickup truck outside of Fisher's house cou-
pled with the officers' observation of Fisher "screaming and throwing
things" made it clear that an occupant of the house might have been in
danger of imminent injury or someone might have been gravely injured in
a car accident. But what about a simple verbal altercation between a
husband and wife or parent and child that is audible from outside of the
house? Or a situation where a person with a previously damaged vehicle
has a screaming match inside the house, which can be heard from the
street? Or when someone suffers a minor cut while outside and leaves
blood on the door before going inside? Would those situations make an
officer's warrantless entry into a house reasonable? Based on the Court's
holding in Fisher, such an argument could be made. That "[o]fficers do
not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' injury to in-
voke the emergency aid exception," could save lives in face of an ongoing
violent situation-officers need not wait for serious injury before enter-
ing a residence. 143 But this interpretation could also allow warrantless
police entry of residences in situations where common sense dictates en-
try is unreasonable. It remains to be seen how frequently Fisher will ap-
ply to justify warrantless entries into homes.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 548 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("[L]aw enforce-
ment officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an
injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.")).
141. Id. at 549 (quoting People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 633, at *4
(Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008) (not designated for publication)).
142. Id. at 548-49.
143. Id. at 549 (quoting Fisher, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 633, at *4).
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C. EXPANSION OF TEXAS'S PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
One exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is the
Plain View Doctrine. The warrantless seizure of an item is lawful under
the plain view doctrine when three requirements are met: (1) law en-
forcement officers must lawfully be in a place where the item can be
viewed in plain sight; (2) it must be immediately apparent to the officers
that the item constitutes evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime;
and (3) the officers must have the lawful right to access the object. 144
However, during the 2011 Survey period, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals made significant changes to its previous interpretation of the
"immediately apparent" requirement.
The Court of Criminal Appeals issued State v. Dobbs ten days outside
of the Survey period. However, it is an important enough opinion to in-
clude in this article. In Dobbs, Plano police officers searched Dobbs's
residence pursuant to a warrant, where they happened upon two sets golf
clubs that "looked brand new."'145 There was no question that the clubs
were in plain view-they were in the middle of the bedroom floor.
146
The officers also found "brand new golf shirts" embroidered with the
logo from a local country club in a closet connected to the bedroom. 14 7
The officers did not have probable cause to believe the merchandise was
stolen, but were subsequently informed that the country club recently re-
ported theft of certain golf merchandise after contacting police dis-
patch. 148 Via direct communication with the country club, the officers
developed probable cause that the clubs and shirts were stolen prop-
erty. 149 The officers seized the property and Dobbs was charged with
theft.150
In support of his motion to suppress the seized items, Dobbs argued
that it was not "immediately apparent" that the items were contraband
because the officers did not have probable cause to believe that the items
were stolen when they first discovered them.151 The trial judge, based on
White v. State,'52 granted Dobbs's suppression motion, and the court of
appeals affirmed. 153
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals used State v. Dobbs to modify its
prior reading of the plain view doctrine. 154 According to the settled rule
prior to Dobbs, compliance with the doctrine required, among other
things, that it be "immediately apparent" to law enforcement that the
144. Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
145. State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 185-86.
149. Id. at 186.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 729 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
153. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d at 186.
154. See generally id.
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seized items were evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime.155 In
White v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals construed the plain view
doctrine to require an additional layer of probable cause for further in-
vestigation to develop the probable cause needed to seize an item in plain
view if police officers did not instantly recognize the item as
contraband.156
But now, after the Court of Criminal Appeals's opinion in Dobbs,
White is no longer good law, and the plain view doctrine in Texas is back
in line with the Supreme Court's version of the doctrine. In Dobbs, the
State argued that White "overextends the legitimate scope of Fourth
Amendment protection," and the Court of Criminal Appeals "agree[d]
with the State's assessment." 157 The court held that:
So long as the probable cause to believe that items in plain view
constitute contraband arises while the police are still lawfully on the
premises, and their 'further investigation' into the nature of those
items does not entail an additional and unjustified search of .... or
presence on .... the premises, [the seizure of those items is permissi-
ble under the Fourth Amendment.]1 58
The court made clear that the rule in Dobbs does not apply to cases
where the further investigation "incrementally impinge[s] upon any pro-
tected privacy or possessory interest of the defendant. 1 59 The court
stated that the further investigation in Dobbs did not exceed the scope of
the original search warrant.' 60 The court then held that the officers
seized the golf merchandise while still legitimately on the premises and
after they developed probable cause to believe the merchandise was
stolen.161
The new rule to be taken from Dobbs is that the plain view doctrine in
Texas requires an officer to have probable cause to believe an item is
contraband before seizing it-there is no longer a requirement that of-
ficers have probable cause to believe an item is contraband at the exact
moment they see it. It is also important to note that in Dobbs the Court
of Criminal Appeals used federal law to reinterpret the plain view doc-
trine, something practitioners should be aware of when putting together
arguments for or against the suppression of evidence. 162 "The Supreme
Court has construed 'immediately apparent' to mean simply that the
viewing officers must have probable cause to believe an item in plain
view is contraband before seizing it."' 163
155. See, e.g., Haley v. State, 811 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Joseph v.
State, 807 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Powell, 268 S.W.3d 626, 632-33
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008).
156. 729 S.W.2d at 741.
157. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d at 186-87.
158. Id. at 189.
159. Id. at 188.
160. Id.
161. Id.




D. THE "NEW" SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION TO THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Recently, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant limited the search
incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment.164 The Court held that police officers may not search a vehicle
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant after the arrestee was secured
and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. 165 Explaining when search
of an automobile after arresting a recent occupant is permissible, the
Court stated that "circumstances unique to the automobile context justify
a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence
of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle."'1 66 The following
is a discussion of how Gant appears to affect Texas law during this Survey
period.
In the Fifth Circuit case United States v. Steele, the defendant was
stopped because of his expired license plate. 167 He argued the search of
the compartment under the carpet in his trunk violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. He argued that because he was secured in the of-
ficer's cruiser when the search took place, the search was not justified
under Gant. After discussing the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, the court held that "[c]ontrary to [the
defendant's] assertion, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Gant is inap-
plicable to the present case as the Court specifically limited its ruling to
searches pursuant to an arrest, and the Court did not modify the stan-
dards regarding searches pursuant to the automobile exception.' 68 In
this case, the Fifth Circuit did not apply Gant because the arrest had not
taken place at the time of the search.
Later, in United States v. Hinojosa, the Fifth Circuit issued a similar
ruling.169 Based on witness information describing the color and type of
vehicle involved in a crime, police stopped the defendant's vehicle. The
officers saw stolen goods in plain view through the vehicle's window. The
district judge held that the officers' search of the vehicle was reasonable
because they had probable cause to believe they would find stolen
goods.' 70 In the Fifth Circuit, the defendant argued the search of his ve-
hicle was unreasonable under Gant, but the court simply held Gant was
inapplicable because there was no arrest involved. 171 Based on these two
cases, it is clear that the Fifth Circuit has taken to heart the Supreme
Court's warning that Gant only applies to searches incident to arrest. So,
unless a search of a defendant's vehicle is made while a defendant is
164. 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 353 F. App'x. 908, 909 (5th Cir. 2009).
168. Id. at 910.
169. No. 4:09-CR-51-1, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17217, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
170. Id. at *3-4.
171. Id. at *4.
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under arrest, and evidence of the offense might be in the vehicle, a Gant-
based argument in the Fifth Circuit will prove fruitless.
The Dallas Court of Appeals faced a different issue concerning
Gant.172 In granting Ogeda's motion to suppress, the trial judge ex-
plained an officer's subjective intent in searching a vehicle is important in
determining reasonableness of an automobile search under Gant.173 He
stated that officer testimony explaining the purpose of the search was
necessary to determine reasonableness. 174 The State disagreed and ap-
pealed. The court of appeals reversed, explaining that "[t]he fact that the
officer does not have the state of mind providing the legal justification for
her action does not invalidate the action taken, so long as the circum-
stances, viewed objectively, justify it," and "[b]ased on the totality of the
circumstances in this case, we conclude an arresting officer could have
reasonably believed that evidence supporting the . . . arrest would be
found in the car.' 75 Therefore, Ogeda stands for the proposition that in
determining the reasonableness of a search under Gant, as long as the
totality of the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the search, it is
unnecessary to know the exact purpose of the search.
In Palacios v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals agreed with the
holding in Ogeda that the circumstances, not the searching officer's sub-
jective intent, dictate the reasonableness of a vehicle search under
Gant.176 But the court of appeals's interpretation of Gant is at odds with
the Fifth Circuit's interpretation. Although Palacios was driving during
the day-a time when the use of headlights is not required-he neverthe-
less had them turned on. And Texas law requires that: "A taillamp or a
separate lamp ... be constructed and mounted to emit a white light that
... illuminates the rear license plate," and that "[a] taillamp, including a
separate lamp used to illuminate a rear license plate, must emit a light
when a headlamp or auxiliary driving lamp is lighted."' 77 "While
Palacios may not have had a duty to have the lights on his van turned on,
because the lights on his van were in fact turned on, [Texas law] required
that the van's rear license plate also be illuminated." But Palacios's rear
license plate was not illuminated, so a police officer pulled him over.1 78
The officer then summoned another officer for help. The officers subse-
quently learned that neither Palacios nor his passenger had a driver's li-
cense. Both officers testified that Palacios was acting nervous. Palacios
and his passenger also gave conflicting stories about where they were go-
ing. Because neither of the vehicle's occupants had a driver's license, the
officers impounded the vehicle and conducted an inventory search. Dur-
ing the search, the officers noticed a "strong odor of fabric softener,"
172. State v. Ogeda, 315 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. ref'd).
173. Id. at 666.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 667.
176. 319 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet. h.).
177. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.322(f)-(g) (West 2010).
178. Palacios, 319 S.W.3d at 73.
[Vol. 64
Criminal Procedure
which is used "to mask odors of illegal drugs. ' 179 After the search pro-
duced a suitcase containing marijuana, Palacios and his passenger were
arrested.
The court of appeals appears to construe portions of Gant in a way that
conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's reading of the case. As discussed above,
the Fifth Circuit will only apply Gant if the search is incident to an ar-
rest. 180 In Palacios, the search was a lawful inventory search and the of-
ficers did not arrest Palacios and his passenger until after the search. But
the court did not simply use lawful impoundment and inventory to justify
the warrantless search; it used Gant.181 Quoting Gant, the court ex-
plained "that 'if there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evi-
dence of criminal activity,' officers may without a warrant search 'any
area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.' "182 The court
determined Palacios's nervous behavior, the conflicting stories offered by
Palacios and his passenger, and the odor of fabric softener gave the of-
ficers probable cause to search for drugs inside the suitcase found in the
vehicle. 183 But this application of Gant conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's
application-neither Palacios nor his passenger were under arrest when
the search took place. Therefore, attorneys in Texas should be aware that
the forum-state or federal court-may be determinative of whether
Gant will be applied.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied Gant in State v. Elias. In
Elias, a police officer had information that led him to believe Elias's van
contained narcotics.184 The officer noticed Elias sitting at a stop sign in a
turn-only lane but without a turn signal. After the officer passed Elias,
Elias turned right. The officer made a u-turn and stopped Elias. When
the officer learned of Elias's prior outstanding warrants, the officer ar-
rested Elias. While Elias was under arrest, the officer's canine sniffed the
van exterior. After the canine alerted to an area of the van, the officer
conducted a search and found marijuana. The trial judge granted Elias's
suppression motion finding, among other things, that the officer did not
have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Elias or to believe that a
traffic violation had occurred. 185 Based on Gant, the court of appeals
upheld the trial judge's ruling.' 86 The court found that while Elias was
under arrest he was not close enough to his van to gain access to the
inside.187 The court also found that there was no reasonable basis to be-
179. Id. at 75.
180. See United States v. Hinojosa, No. 4:09-CR-51-1, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17217, at
*4 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
181. Palacios, 319 S.W.3d at 75.
182. Id. (quoting Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721).
183. Id.
184. State v. Elias, No. 08-08-00085-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2731, at *1 (Tex.
App.-E1 Paso Apr. 14, 2010).
185. Id. at *4.
186. Id. at *10-12.
187. Id. at *11-12.
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lieve that evidence of Elias's offenses could be found in the van.188 The
Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary
review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in finding the
search unreasonable.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals's applica-
tion of Gant,189 which is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's application. 190
Observing that Elias was arrested before the van was searched, the Court
held that the search of the van was not a lawful search incident to arrest
under Gant because Elias "had stepped away from the van by the time
the search was conducted, and no evidence of [Elias's] offenses" could
reasonably be expected to be found in a search of the van.19'
IV. CONCLUSION
During the 2011 Survey period, the Supreme Court did some major
work in the area of confessions, searches, and seizures-especially con-
fessions. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reinterpreted the plain
view doctrine, and lower federal and state courts continued to follow es-
tablished law. It will be interesting to see how Texas judges and attorneys
deal with the changes to the law made during this Survey period.
188. Id.
189. State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
190. United States v. Steele, 353 F. App'x. 908, 910 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Hinojosa, No. 4:09-CR-51-1, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17217, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
191. Elias, 339 S.W.3d at 677.
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